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TRACKING BOULDER: THE POTENTIAL ANTITRUST
VULNERABILITY OF A CITY FOR ENACTING A RENT
CONTROL ORDINANCE
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1982, the Supreme Court held in Community Communica-
tions Co. v. Boulder' that a municipality may be liable if its actions
violate antitrust laws. Under Boulder, a city could be sued for enact-
ing an ordinance that has anticompetitive effects. Commentators ex-
pected a flood of litigation against cities to result from the decision;'
conceivably, after the Boulder ruling, the Sherman Antitrust Act as
the "Magna Carta of free enterprise"' would afford a cause of action
to contractors, developers, and other citizens who feel that a city has
slighted their economic interests. Courts have consistently denied this
potential class of plaintiffs an equivalent constitutional cause of ac-
tion since the close of the "Lochner era."4 In post-Lochner decisions,
the Supreme Court decided that courts must carefully refrain from
dictating to local legislatures the proper balance to be struck between
competing economic and social welfare considerations.' This practice
of striking down regulatory legislation when it conflicts with laissez-
faire economic theory, under the authority of economic substantive
due process, is known as "Lochnerizing."'
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1. 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
2. Vanderstar, Liability of Municipalities Under the Antitrust Laws: Litigation Strate-
gies, 32 CATH. U. L. REV. 395, 395 (1982-83); Page, After Boulder - Some Practical Advice
for Avoiding Antitrust Liability, 9 CURRENT MUN. PROB. 264, 264 (1982-83); Hoskins, The
"Boulder Revolution" in Municipal Antitrust Law, 70 ILL. B. J. 684, 684 (1982).
3. Boulder, 455 U.S. at 56 n.19 (quoting United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S.
596, 610 (1972)).
4. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), discredited, Nebbia v. New York, 291
U.S. 502 (1934); see infra note 6.
5. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963) (courts are not to "substitute their
social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies who are elected to pass
laws."); Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949)
(courts will not sit as a "superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation"). See also New
Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976), in which the same principles are applied in an action
involving a city ordinance.
6. 198 U.S. 45.. The practice is considered to be an unwarranted judicial assumption of
legislative authority. See G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 502-40 (1979) (thorough dis-
cussion of economic substantive due process). The term Lochnerizing is used in its secondary
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The conflict between the Boulder holding and the anti-Lochner
string of Supreme Court cases poses a dilemma for the federal
courts. Following Boulder, an aggrieved party may bring an action
against a city if the legislative or administrative decisions of the city
result in anticompetitive consequences. Under current antitrust case
law, a city violates the antitrust laws every time it decides to displace
competition with regulation in order to further some social/welfare
goal. If a federal court considered the merits of an antitrust claim
against a city according to the existing standards, it would, in effect,
force the city to weigh the interests of competition more heavily than
any other interests. Arguably, this would amount to the discredited
practice of "Lochnerizing. '1 To avoid this conflict, the federal courts
should judge antitrust claims against cities according to different
standards than those used in current antitrust case law.
One potential source of antitrust litigation against cities is a
rent control ordinance. The escalating cost of rental housing com-
bined with the burgeoning tenant population in many metropolitan
areas has influenced several cities to enact rent control ordinances.
Whether these ordinances place a ceiling on rents, or whether they
force a landlord to submit to mediation and arbitration if he raises
the rent more than a certain percentage in a year, such ordinances
are anticompetitive because they restrict the ability of market forces
to set the price.
This comment explores the potential antitrust vulnerability of a
city for enacting a rent control ordinance. Using the rent control or-
dinance of the city of San Jose as an illustration, Part II sets out the
pertinent provisions in a typical ordinance and outlines the cause of
action that would most likely be asserted against the city based on
those provisions. Part III illustrates the intricate maneuvers used to
avoid liability under the existing case law as it has developed with
regard to private corporations. Part IV proposes a standard, conso-
nant with Boulder, for determining a city's antitrust vulnerability;
the comment concludes by recommending a special standard of liabil-
ity for the city defendant.
II. SAN JOSE'S RENT CONTROL ORDINANCE
The city of San Jose's rent control ordinance will be used illus-
tratively in this comment. Because every city chooses to enact, write,
meaning to refer to any instance that appears to be a return to the discredited practice. See,
e.g., 455 U.S. at 67-68 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
7. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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and enforce its ordinances in different ways, each pattern leads to
different antitrust arguments. The general argument is the same,
however-and this comment's proposal is not dependent on the par-
ticular manner of writing, enacting, or enforcing ordinances which
has been chosen by San Jose.
San Jose enacted its rent control ordinance in response to the
skyrocketing cost and diminishing supply of rental housing." The or-
dinance provides that if a landlord raises the rent more than eight
percent in a year,' the tenant can invoke a specially designed media-
tion/arbitration process.10 Through this process, a determination is
made as to whether the increased rent is reasonable.1 The media-
tion/arbitration process must be invoked by the tenant 1 -no auto-
matic action is taken by the city when a landlord increases the rent
more than eight percent and no determination made by the mediator
or arbitrator is effective unless the tenant is a party to the
proceeding.1"
The cause of action that would be asserted on these facts would
probably be based on section 1 of the Sherman Act."4 The plaintiff-
landlord would allege that the ordinance was enacted and is enforced
pursuant to a combination or conspiracy between the tenant-citizens
and the city, and thus constitutes an unreasonable restraint of trade.
The landlord would further allege injury to his business, consisting
of deprivation of the profits he would have made if free competition
had not been hindered.
III. A MODEL FOR A DEFENSE UNDER THE PRESENT LAW
Congress has recently barred recovery of money damages in an-
titrust actions against local governments. 5 However, there are many
lesser evils that can result from antitrust litigation, although confined
to injunctive and declaratory relief, that could hit the city hard
8. SAN JOSE, CAL., MUN. CODE § 17.23.020 (1979).
9. SAN JOSE, CAL., MUN. CODE § 17.23.180 (1979).
10. SAN JOSE, CAL., MUN. CODE § 17.23.220 (1979).
11. SAN JOSE, CAL., MUN. CODE §§ 17.23.300, 17.23.400 (1979). A landlord is al-
lowed to pass through increased costs attributable to the rental unit. SAN JOSE, CAL., MUN.
CODE § 17.23.440(A) (1979).
12. SAN JOSE, CAL., MUN. CODE § 17.23.220 (1979).
13. SAN JOSE, CAL., MUN. CODE § 17.23.430 (1979).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
15. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982). Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984,
Pub. L. 98-544. The statute proscribes damages actions. Thus, a city is no longer in danger of
financial liability. A city may, however, be liable to suit for injunctive or declaratory relief. As
used in this comment, references to "a city's liability" mean the latter variety.
19851
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enough to threaten its fiscal integrity.
The cost of litigating antitrust claims is monumental, largely
due to the expense of the discovery process. Discovery is the "heart"
of every antitrust case.16 The American discovery process, to the ex-
tent it is necessary in an antitrust action, is so expensive that many
foreign courts believe American courts are "unable to do justice."1"
Antitrust litigation tends to drag on for years, due to the time it takes
attorneys to wade through the discovered documents and to the ex-
pertise antitrust lawyers have developed in employing delaying
tactics.' 8
Due to the costly character of antitrust litigation, it benefits a
defendant to be able to initially limit the case to some threshold is-
sue. A defendant who can prevail in a motion to dismiss or for sum-
mary judgment can prevent much of the cost that makes even win-
ning an antitrust case a tremendous financial loss.
The most vital concern of a city involved in an antitrust action,
however, is not the potential financial loss. A city's municipal sover-
eignty is threatened by an antitrust plaintiff's ability to obtain in-
junctive or declaratory relief which voids the city's laws. The conse-
quence of this ability could be a shift of the power to govern from
those elected by the citizens to perform this function, to any persons
who wish to file antitrust actions against the city. The resulting un-
certainty and inability to order the city's social/welfare goals could
cripple local government.
This section will explore the probability that a city could suc-
cessfully defend an antitrust claim based on its enactment of a rent
control ordinance. Special attention will be paid to the ability to pre-
vail at an early stage, in order to minimize the staggering costs of
litigating an antitrust action to a conclusion on the merits.
A. Immunity
1. State Action
State action is immune from antitrust law when a state is acting
16. In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1155 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
17. Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Pan Am. World Airways, 559 F. Supp 1124, 1132 (D.D.C.
1983).
18. Both parties in the recently dismissed Justice Dep't suit against IBM rented ware-
houses to store the discovered documents, and paid large yearly bonuses to the attorneys to
keep them from quitting. After dragging on for 13 years, the suit was dismissed. United States
v. International Business Machines, No. 69 Civ 200-Civ No. 72-344 (S.D.N.Y. dismissed
1982).
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in its sovereign/governmental role." This immunity flows from con-
stitutional principles of federalism. 0 Private parties can benefit from
state action immunity when they act pursuant to a "clearly articu-
lated and affirmatively expressed ... state policy" and when the
activity is "actively supervised by the State."'"
Until recently it was assumed that a city, as a governmental
entity, had immunity analogous to a state's immunity. In 1978, in
City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.," Justice Bren-
nan stated for a plurality of the Court that a city is only immune if
it is acting pursuant to state policy to displace competition with reg-
ulation. 8 Thus, a city's immunity is analogous to that which a pri-
vate party can claim under the state's immunity; a city does not have
sovereign immunity comparable to that of a state.'
19. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). This was the original case seeking to find a
state agency liable under the antitrust laws. California enacted a statute designed to stabilize
the price of raisins. The commissioner named in the suit (Parker) was the head of the agency
set up to administer the statute. Although price stabilization is price fixing, a classic per se
offense, the Court held that the state was not liable. Principles of federalism compelled the
Court to conclude that the state was immune to antitrust liability. Id.
20. Id. at 350-51:
We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history which
suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officer or agents from
activities directed by its legislature. In a dual system of government in which,
under the Constitution, the states are sovereign, save only as Congress may con-
stitutionally subtract from their authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a
state's control over its officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to
Congress.
Id.
21. California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105
(1980) (to confer immunity, state policy must be affirmatively expressed and actively super-
vised). Midcal involved a California statute that compelled liquor wholesalers and distillers to
publish price lists and to adhere to them. The Court found the statute invalid because, al-
though the statute provided a clear articulation of state policy, the state did not supervise the
activity mandated by the statute.
22. 435 U.S. 389 (1978). In this case, the City of Lafayette originally brought an anti-
trust suit against the Louisiana Power and Light Company. Louisiana Power and Light coun-
terclaimed, charging the city with the classic offense of tying (sale of a desirable product is
conditioned on the buyer also buying a non-desirable product). Louisiana Power and Light
alleged that the city contracted to supply customers outside of the city boundaries with gas and
water only if the customers would buy electricity from the city instead of Louisiana Power and
Light. Apparently the city had the only available supply of water and gas.
23. Id. at 413. The Court did not reach the question of whether the actions of a city
required active state supervision, the second criterion in Midcal, or if the policy was clearly
articulated, because the Court found no state policy existed.
24. Chief Justice Burger, in his concurring opinion, distinguished a city's proprietary
activity from its traditional function activity. The Chief Justice would extend immunity to the
city when it has no proprietary interest in the controversial activity, and would not let the city
enjoy immunity when it did have a proprietary interest. Id. at 418-26 (Burger, C.J.,
concurring).
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In Community Communications Co. v. Boulder,2 5 a majority of
the Court agreed with Justice Brennan's position.2 In Boulder, the
Supreme Court held that a city is only immune from antitrust liabil-
ity when it is acting "in furtherance or implementation of clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy."'27  It is not
enough that a state has granted general legislative power to a munic-
ipality, the state must have contemplated the displacement of compe-
tition with regulation in the specific areas regulated. A grant of gen-
eral legislative power evinces "mere neutrality," and is an
insufficient showing of state policy. 28
California has no statute authorizing municipalities to impose
rent control. 9 Consequently, a city cannot look to the legislature for
a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy favoring
rent control.3 0 There is, however, one possible way to show state
action immunity.
In Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley,"1 a group of landlords chal-
lenged the city of Berkeley's authority under the California Consti-
tution, to create a rent control provision. 2 The California Supreme
Court held that the city had the power to impose local rent controls
under article XI, section 7 of the California Constitution, 3 which
confers on municipalities general local police power.
A city could claim that the California Supreme Court's holding
25. 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
26. This included Justice Blackman, who had dissented earlier in Lafayette, 435 U.S.
389, 441 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
27. Boulder, 455 U.S. at 51-52 n.14. As in Lafayette, the Boulder Court did not reach
the issue of whether active state supervision is required for municipal immunity.
28. Id. (emphasis in original).
29. Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 17 Cal. 3d 129, 140, 550 P.2d 1001, 130 Cal. Rptr.
465 (1977). The only rent control statute California has is CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
50202 (West Supp. 1984). The statute provides that a municipality cannot impose rent control
on housing that has been in any way financed by the Dep't of Housing and Community Dev.
or the California Housing Finance Agency. The purpose of this statute is to encourage private
developers to build low-cost rental housing by assuring them that the city will not be able to
impose rent controls on the housing. The state however, reserves the right to impose controls in
the financing contract. The statute is part of California's plan to ensure sufficient affordable
housing, and is not inconsistent with city-imposed rent controls on rental housing not covered
by the statute.
30. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
31. 17 Cal. 3d 129, 550 P.2d 1001, 130 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1977).
32. Berkeley's rent control provision was contained in an amendment to the Berkeley
City Charter passed by the initiative process. Id. at 135, 500 P.2d at 1006, 130 Cal. Rptr. at
470.
33. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 7. "[Local Ordinances and Regulations.] A county.or city
may make and enforce within its limits all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and
regulations not in conflict with general laws."
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constituted an articulation of state policy by an entity representing
California as a sovereign. This argument would follow that in Bates
v. State Bar of Arizona. 4 In Bates, the plaintiffs argued that the
Arizona Bar's proscription of attorney price advertising was a re-
straint of trade. The defendants claimed state action immunity.3 5
The challenged rules were promulgated by the Arizona Supreie
Court." The Supreme Court in Bates held that the Bar was im-
mune under the state action doctrine because the rules it enforced
were the clearly articulated 3  and affirmatively expressed8" policy of
the Arizona Supreme Court.
In an antitrust action against San Jose, the city could argue that
the California Supreme Court is the "ultimate body" interpreting
the California Constitution. Thus, the California Supreme Court's
interpretation of the constitution, which gave Berkeley the power to
regulate rents, constituted an articulation of a state policy which al-
lows the displacement of competition with regulation in the area of
rent control.39 It seems unlikely that this argument would succeed
under a strict application of Boulder. Undoubtedly, the city of Boul-
der had the power, under the home-rule provisions of Colorado,40 to
pass ordinances regulating the cable television industry. But a city's
constitutional power, as construed by a court, does not demonstrate a
clear intent of the policy-making body-the state legislature-to dis-
34. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
35. Id. at 359.
36. Id. at 360.
37. Id. at 362. The Court stated, "The disciplinary rules reflect a clear articulation of
the State's policy with regard to professional behavior."
38. Id. at 359-60. The Court stated: "(Tihe challenged restraint is the affirmative com-
mand of the Arizona Supreme Court . . . . That court is the ultimate body wielding the
State's power over the practice of law .... "
39. This argument was successful in Hopkinsville Cable T.V. v. Pennyroyal Cablevi-
sion, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 543 (W.D. Ky 1982). The city of Hopkinsville was being sued, inter
alia, under §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. The city claimed state action immunity, id. at 545.
Purporting to follow Boulder, the district court found the city to be immune. The Kentucky
Constitution, as interpreted by "Kentucky's highest appellate court," id. at 546 (emphasis
added), allowed the city to regulate the cable television industry. The district court found this a
clear state policy to displace competition with regulation, pursuant to which the municipality
acted. Id. The municipality thus fell within the Boulder test, and was immune to antitrust
liability.
40. The Boulder Court was careful to distinguish the difference, for antitrust purposes,
between a state "allow[ing] municipalities to do what they please," and a state "contem-
plat[ing]" the displacement of competition with regulation in a particular economic area. Boul-
der, 455 U.S. at 55. Boulder had, under the Colorado Constitution, ultimate power in matters
within its local sphere. Id. at 52. The city's power, in relation to that of the state legislature, is
a matter of state law. The city's liability for wielding that power in a manner inconsistent with
the federal antitrust law is a matter of federal law. Id. at 52 n.15.
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place competition with regulation. Although in Bates the articulation
of policy came from the Arizona Supreme Court, that case is distin-
guishable because the professional behavior of attorneys is an area
over which the court has policy-making authority.4 ' Rent control,
like cable television regulation, is an area of general economic and
social interest, for which the state legislature is the sovereign voice.
The power granted to municipalities under the California Con-
stitution to regulate local affairs is exactly the kind of broad grant of
general powers that the United States Supreme Court characterized
as evincing the state's "mere neutrality" regarding a policy favoring
regulation over competition.4 That the California Supreme Court
construed the constitutional grant to include the power to regulate
the cost of rental housing, means only that the city has that power. It
does not provide a proxy statement of the California legislature's
policy. Consequently, a logical reading of Boulder would not shield
a city from liability simply because the city has the power to regulate
rents as one of its general constitutional powers.
There is, however, another theory of immunity-the Noerr-
Pennington theory-that may shield a city from antitrust attack.
2. Noerr-Pennington Immunity
The alleged offense in an action against a city based on enact-
ment or enforcement of a rent control ordinance would be that the
city conspired to restrain trade in violation of section 1 of the Sher-
man Act. 43 The restraint of trade would be price-fixing, defined as
"raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a
commodity." 44 A rent control ordinance stabilizes the price of rental
housing and is thus susceptible to attack as a restraint of trade.
When a price is "fixed" pursuant to a contract, combination or
conspiracy, the parties to the contract, combination or conspiracy are
liable under section 1 of the Sherman Act. In a suit against a city,
the plaintiff-landlord would allege that the city conspired with the
tenant-citizens or with its officers,45 in enacting and enforcing the
rent control ordinance. The city could argue that it is immune from
liability for this activity under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.'
41. Bates, 433 U.S. at 362.
42. Boulder, 455 U.S. at 55 (emphasis in original).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). "Every contract, combination ...or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade or commerce among the several States . . .is declared to be illegal."
44. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940).
45. See infra notes 67-76, p. III, B. Concert of Action.
46. The doctrine is named after the original cases in which it was formulated: Eastern
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The Noerr-Pennington doctrine is based on the first amendment
right to petition the government and on a policy of protection of the
political process.' 7 It is usually applied to protect parties engaged in
joint efforts to influence legislation, which would otherwise subject
the parties to liability because the legislation sought by the parties
would have an anticompetitive effect on the plaintiff. The principle
underlying the doctrine is that individuals have a first amendment
right to join together to petition the government which would be
heavily burdened if they could incur antitrust liability for so doing.'
Additionally, governmental bodies rely on individuals to express the
people's wishes. Imposing liability on individuals for participating in
this process would impair the political process because individuals
would be deterred from providing government with information."
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine also immunizes from liability
attempts to invoke administrative and judicial processes because the
"right to petition extends to all departments of the Government." 50
Noerr-Pennington shields all genuine"1 efforts of an individual to
invoke governmental processes, even if the sole purpose of the peti-
tioner is anticompetitive." The obvious defects in a city's claim to
Noerr-Pennington immunity are that the city is the governmental
body being petitioned, and that the city is not the usual defendant-
petitioner. Noerr-Pennington in its classic formulation"' immunizes
the petitioner, not the petitioned body.
The lack of cases addressing the issue of the governmental
body's liability is not surprising. The federal government cannot be
sued under the antitrust laws,' and neither can state governmental
entities acting in their official capacities.5 Until Boulder, it was as-
sumed that a municipal government acting in an official capacity was
R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961); United Mine
Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
47. See Forro Precision Inc. v. International Business Machines, 673 F.2d 1045, 1059
(9th Cir. 1982); In re Car Rental Antitrust Litigation, 693 F.2d 84 (9th Cir. 1982). See also
Noerr, 365 U.S. at 137-38.
48. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 138.
49. Id. at 137.
50. California Motor Transit Co. v. Trucking Unltd., 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972).
51. The "sham" exception to Noerr-Pennnigton excludes activities that are not a genu-
ine effort to invoke governmental processes, such as a baseless lawsuit. Id. at 404 U.S. 508.
52. See supra note 51.
53. See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
54. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 136; United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., 307 U.S. 533, 569
(1939).
55. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
1985]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
also immune, 56 without resorting to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.
The question of a city's antitrust vulnerability must now be ad-
dressed because Boulder held that a city is not immune to such a
suit.
In Miracle Mile Associates v. City of Rochester57 the Second
Circuit found that the city defendant was immune from suit under
Noerr-Pennington." The court did not discuss the derivation of city
immunity from the Noerr line of cases holding individual petitioners
immune. In contrast, in In re Airport Car Rental Antitrust Litiga-
tion,59 the federal district court indicated in dicta that individuals
named as part of a conspiracy could be found immune from liability
under Noerr-Pennington, while a municipality named as part of the
same conspiracy could remain unprotected.6
The plaintiffs in an antitrust suit against the city of San Jose
based on its enactment of the Chapter 17.23 rent control ordinance,6"
could argue that the ordinance is the product of a conspiracy or com-
bination between tenant-citizens and the city council of San Jose and
it has the purpose and effect of restraining the landlord's ability to
extract the highest market price from the lease of his rental units."2
Alternatively, the plaintiff-landlords could claim a conspiracy in the
enforcement of the ordinance. The San Jose ordinance is particularly
vulnerable to claims of an enforcement conspiracy because the ordi-
nance cannot be enforced until an injured tenant files a complaint
and participates in the arbitration proceedings."
A tenant-citizen could claim immunity under Noerr-Pen-
56. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
57. 617 F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 1980).
58. The plaintiffs in Miracle Mile alleged that the city entered into a series of baseless
administrative proceedings in order to delay and frustrate the plaintiff's development of a
shopping mall. Id. at 19. The court found that the proceedings were not baseless, because the
city had a legitimate interest in the welfare of its citizens, so the sham exception to Noerr-
Pennington did not apply. Id. at 21; see supra note 50. The court did not reach the issue of
the city's liability under the state action doctrine, since it found the city immune under Noerr-
Pennington. Miracle Mile at 20. Thus, it is unimportant that this case predates Boulder.
59. 521 F. Supp. 568 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
60. "There is ... no necessary or logical relationship between the imposition of liabil-
ity on those who advocate anticompetitive activities and on those who participate in them." Id.
at 584.
61. See supra notes 8-13 and accompanying text.
62. When an ordinance is enacted by initiative of the voters, like Berkeley's rent control
ordinance, the claimed conspiracy would be among the tenant-voters. In Subscription Televi-
sion, Inc. v. Southern Cal. Theatre Owners, 576 F.2d 230, 232 (9th Cir. 1978), the court held
that initiative action taken by voters was immune under Noerr-Pennington.
63. SAN JOSE, CAL., MUNI. CODE § 17.23.430 (1979).
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nington" for his actions in soliciting rent control provisions and in
invoking their enforcement. A city's response to citizen-tenant peti-
tioning activities should also be shielded by a complementary
immunity.
The city could argue that if the alleged offense consists of a
governmental body's response to a citizen's exercise of his right to
petition the government, the governmental body must be protected
from liability or the citizen's right to petition the government is ren-
dered meaningless. A citizen's right of access to the government is
protected so the government can be informed of the citizen's wishes.
If the city has no reciprocal Noerr-Pennington immunity protecting
its reaction to citizen petitions, a citizen's petitions would be ineffec-
tive because the city would fear antitrust liability for any responsive
legislation or enforcement." Accordingly, the city of San Jose should
be immune to liability for enacting or enforcing its rent control
ordinance.
Federal courts, however, may refuse to extend Noerr-Pen-
nington immunity to the city because this might negate the Boulder
holding that a city is not immune to antitrust liability under the state
action doctrine. It is likely that a federal court would find that ex-
tending Noerr-Pennington immunity to cities would allow them to
evade the Boulder ruling." If the district court hearing the rent con-
trol case were to follow this view, the city would then have to carry
the expense of defending the merits of the claim.
B. Concert of Action
In order to succeed with a Sherman Act section 1 claim, it is
necessary to prove some contract, combination, or conspiracy. Unilat-
eral anticompetitive actions do not violate section 1." No contract is
64. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
65. Cf Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982) (the first amendment right
to free speech carried with it a reciprocal right of school children to receive ideas).
66. This theory is not necessarily accurate. Noerr-Pennington immunity extended to
petitioned cities would only shield actions of the city taken in response to citizen petitioning.
Any other contract, combination or conspiracy engaged in by the city would render it liable -
this would not be true if the city were protected by state action immunity; see supra notes 46-
49 and accompanying text.
67. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 149 (1967); Greyhound Rent-A-Car, Inc. v.
City of Pensacola, 676 F.2d 1380, 1383 (11 th Cir. 1982); Mason City Center Assoc. v. City of
Mason City, 671 F.2d 1146, 1149 (8th Cir. 1982); Hill Aircraft & Leasing Corp. v. Fulton
County, Ga., 561 F. Supp. 667, 676 (N.D. Ga. 1982); Enrico's Inc. v. Rice, 551 F. Supp. 511,
513 (N.D. Cal. 1982); Kendrick v. City Council of Augusta, Georgia, 516 F. Supp. 1134,
1141 (S.D. Ga. 1981).
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implicated in this situation because the city has not contracted with
anyone. This leaves possible allegations of combination or
conspiracy.
Plaintiffs could allege a combination or conspiracy between ei-
ther 1) the city and its citizens; 2) the city and its officers; or, 3) the
city's officers and citizens; in enacting and/or enforcing its rent con-
trol ordinance. A city's first line of defense should be that the allega-
tions of conspiracy must fail for lack of "duality."
Duality, and thus concerted action,"8 demands that there be two
parties."9 The city could claim that there was no duality here, analo-
gizing to the intracorporate conspiracy cases.70 The city could argue
that plaintiff's claims correspond to that of a claim of conspiracy be-
tween a corporation and its officers, and between a corporation and
its shareholders. "Since a corporation has no way of acting except
through officers and employees, the officers and employees are part
of the same economic unit as the corporation for antitrust pur-
poses. ' '1  Thus, a corporation cannot conspire with its officers and
employees because an antitrust conspiracy requires at least two eco-
nomic units.
Similarly, a city is a "municipal corporation. '72 Its citizens are
akin to a private sector corporation's shareholders. Just as sharehold-
ers can only act through the corporation, citizens can only act
through the city. Further, just as the corporation can only act
through its officers and employees, the city can only act through its
officials and employees. When citizens act through the city which in
turn acts through its officials and employees, there is no duality of
action. All of the actors function as one unit. There is no conspiracy,
and consequently no section 1 violation.
If the shareholders, officers, or employees of the corporation act
in furtherance of private rather than corporate goals, the sharehold-
ers, officers or employees become separate economic units-not
68. A conspiracy is a form of concerted action.
69. "You must have two entities to have a conspiracy." Timken Roller Bearing Co. v.
United States, 341 U.S. 593, 606 (1951)Jackson, J., dissenting).
70. An intracorporate conspiracy is a conspiracy between a parent corporation and a
subsidiary, Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 598 (1951), or a corpo-
ration and its officers or employees, Schwimmer v. Sony Corp. of Am., 677 F.2d 946, 953 (2d
Cir. 1982); or a corporation and its shareholders, Goldlawr, Inc. v. Shubert, 276 F.2d 614, 617
(3d Cir. 1960).
The Supreme Court recently held that there can be no conspiracy between a parent and a
wholly owned company. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Co., 104 S. Ct. 2731
(1984).
71. Holter v. Moore & Co., 702 F.2d 854, 855 (10th Cir. 1983).
72. BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 222 (5th ed. 1979).
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merely levels of the same corporate unit. Accordingly, duality and
conspiracy are possible.7 ' Because there is no reason to believe that
the city's officers are acting other than in the interests of the city
when they enact a rent control ordinance, the single-unit theory
should apply between the city and the city officers and employees
and should make duality and conspiracy impossible. However, ten-
ant-citizens, in advocating and in calling upon the city to enforce a
rent control ordinance, are pursuing private goals. For example, the
tenant wants a rent control ordinance so that he personally will not
have to pay large rent increases. The tenant may want rent control
because it is a generally beneficial measure, but he certainly wants it
because it benefits him. Because the tenant-citizen is acting in fur-
therance of a private goal as well as the municipal goal, he is capa-
ble of conspiring with the city to create and to enforce a rent control
ordinance to the detriment of the plaintiff-landlord's business. Thus,
under this analysis, the city could still be liable for violating section 1
of the Sherman Act, if the other elements of the offense are met.
Yet, there is an additional argument for denying concert of ac-
tion. Usually, when a city enacts and enforces an ordinance, it can
argue forcefully that it is not acting in concert with outside parties;
rather, it is unilaterally imposing its governmental will for the public
good.74 Unfortunately, San Jose's ordinance specifically provides that
the landlord-tenant mediation/arbitration process can not take place
unless the affected tenant participates; the ordinance is only enforced
at the tenant's behest.7 ' Arguably, this amounts to a provision that
the ordinance will only be enforced through a tenant-city conspiracy.
Under San Jose's ordinance, the tenant and the city conspire to in-
73. H. & B. Equip. Co., Inc. v. Int'l Harvester Co., 577 F.2b 239, 244 (5th Cir. 1978);
Morton Bldgs. of Neb., Inc. v. Morton Bldgs., Inc., 531 F.2d 910, 917 (8th Cir. 1976).
74. Cf. Mason City Center Assoc. v. City of Mason City, 671 F.2d 1146, 1149. In this
case the city council voted unanimously to deny plantiff - developer's application for a zoning
change which he needed in order to build a shopping center in Mason City's suburbs. The
council openly, and in writing, supported the downtown mall of the other named defendants
who were rivals of plantiff. The council members denied plantiff's request for a zoning change
because they believed a downtown mall would be better for the city, and insisted that this was
a unilateral conclusion. The court agreed, finding that there was no contract, combination or
conspiracy-and thus no violation.
Cf. also Enrico's Inc. v. Rice, 551 F. Supp. 511, 513 (N.D. Cal. 1982). This case ad-
dressed the question of whether a California statute violated the Sherman Act, after an earlier
court had already decided that there was no state action immunity. The court decided that
there was no violation because there was no duality-each plantiff was unilaterally required
to comply with the statute.
75. "No determination made under the provisions of this Chapter shall be effective with
respect to any rental unit unless the tenant of such unit is a party to the proceeding." SAN
JosE, CAL., MUNI. CODE § 17.23.430 (1979).
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jure the landlord's business by restricting the profits he is able to
make. Thus, the city can be liable for violating section 1 if the other
elements of the offense are met.76
C. The Merits
1. Which Rule Applies-Per se or Rule of Reason?"
The plaintiffs in a suit against the city grounded on a rent con-
trol ordinance might claim that the per se rule applies because the
offense is maximum price-fixing, 8 a classic per se offense. In addi-
tion, the plaintiffs might contend that the city was guilty of resale
price maintenance, another per se offense.
A close inspection, however, shows that the facts of this claim
do not fit the classic model. First, there is no horizontal price fixing
arrangement involved because the city is not a competitor of the
landlords, as a per se violation of horizontal maximum price fixing
requires. 9 The recognized vertical per se price fixing offense in-
volves resale price maintenance. Resale price maintenance occurs
when a manufacturer or distributor of goods stipulates a price to his
buyer at which the buyer must sell the goods to the buyer's custom-
ers.00 To have resale price maintenance, there must be a resale to a
third party.81 In this case, there is no "resale;" the only "sale" is
76. It is ironic that provisions included by San Jose in order to prevent rent controls
from being imposed unless the tenant was enough disturbed by a rent increase to invoke and to
carry through the mediation/arbitration process, provide such a useful tool to plaintiff-land-
lords in pursuing their suit.
77. The difference between the per se rule and the rule of reason is cogently explained
in Continental T.V., Inc. v. G.T.E. Sylvania, Inc. 433 U.S. 36, 49-50 (1977):
Since the early years of this century a judicial gloss on [section 1 ] has es-
tablished the "rule of reason" as the prevailing standard of [antitrust] analysis.
[citation omitted]. Under this rule, the factfinder weighs all of the circumstances
of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as im-
posing an unreasonable restraint on competition. Per se rules of illegality are
appropriate only if they relate to conduct that is manifestly anticompetitive.
See also Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982) (statement of the
per se rule; "[O]nce experience with a particular kind of restraint enables the Court to predict
with confidence that the rule of reason will condemn it, it has applied a conclusive presump-
tion that the restraint in unreasonable."). Id. at 344.
78. Maximum price fixing is a per se offense, Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 151-53; Maricopa,
457 U.S. at 346-47.
79. Horizontal maximum price fixing exists when a group of competitors fix a ceiling
on the price to be changed for their goods and services. Maximum price fixing is considered a
per se offense because the theoretical "maximum" price usually indicates the actual minimum
price, and because price setting interferes with market forces whether the price set is a mini-
mum or maximum. See generally Maricopa, 457 U.S. 332.
80. Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 151.
81. Feldman v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 562 F. Supp. 941, 947 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
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from the landlord to the tenant. Because there is no resale, there is
no resale price maintenance and no per se offense.8
Moreover, a city's imposition of rent controls differs fundamen-
tally from the classic price fixing violation. Unlike the classic private
industry case, the city itself does not benefit from the restraint.8" If a
case does not fit a classic mold, the per se rule does not apply.84
However, that there is no per se offense does not mean that
there is no violation of the antitrust laws. Rent control ordinances
interfere with the competitive forces that set market prices, and thus
constitute "restraints of trade."8 However, because this is not a per
se violation, the issue is whether it is an unreasonable restraint
under the rule of reason.86
2. Application of the Rule of Reason
Under the rule of reason, the court will examine the purpose
and effects of the alleged restraining practice and balance its benefits
against its anticompetitive effects to decide whether the restraint is
"unreasonable." However, as the Supreme Court recently made
clear in National Society of Professional Engineers v. United
States,87 not all beneficial goals and effects may be weighed together
82. Id.
83. Even in National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (see
discussion infra note 87 and accompanying text), where the restraint was allegedly imposed to
benefit the public, the Society planned to benefit from the restraint by aggrandizing the reputa-
tion of Society engineers.
84. In order to apply a per se rule, the courts must have enough "experience with a
particular kind of restraint [to enable them] to predict with confidence that the rule of reason
will condemn it." Maricopa Medical, 457 U.S. at 344; see supra note 77. See also White
Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963). In White Motor, discussing vertical division
of territories, the Court stated:
We need to know more than we do about the actual impact of these arrange-
ments on competition to decide whether they have such a 'pernicious effect on
competition and lack ... any redeeming virtue' [Northern Pac. R.R. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1, 51] and therefore should be classified as per se violations of
the Sherman Act.
Id. at 263.
Due to the lack of cases discussing a city's liability for passing an ordinance with adverse
competitive effects, the courts do not have the necessary experience with this "offense" to deal
with it under the per se label. Also, there is no parallel from the private sector - it is difficult
to imagine a situation where a corporation would have the motive and power to impose a
philanthropic price fixing scheme on persons with whom it has no commercial connection.
Since a city-imposed ordinance parallels no classic private restraint, there is no basis for em-
ploying the per se rule.
85. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). See also Feldman, 562 F. Supp. at 948.
86. See Continental T.V., Inc., 433 U.S. at 49-50.
87. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
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in the equation. Whether the per se or rule of reason test is imposed,
the courts will only look at "the competitive significance of the re-
straint," and not at whether or not the policy is in the public inter-
est. 88 Only pro-competitive goals and effects will justify an anticom-
petitive practice; the courts will not consider evidence of extra-
economic policies.89
It is difficult to conceive of a single argument that a city could
make that its rent control ordinance is pro-competitive. While the
city has a beneficial goal-the protection of the health, safety, and
welfare of the citizens of San Jose 9 -this goal is not admissible
under the National Society of Professional Engineers test because it
has nothing to do with competition." Because the beneficial goal and
the advantageous effects of the city's rent control ordinance are irrel-
evant to an antitrust analysis, the city would probably be found lia-
ble under the rule of reason test.
IV. MODEL FOR A NEW STANDARD WHEN THE DEFENDANT IS
A CITY
A. Why is There a Need for a New Standard?
Although it may be possible for a city to prevail when it is sued
for enacting or enforcing a rent control ordinance, it can do so only
by concocting elaborate, strangulated arguments."' The problem is
that this process is time consuming and therefore more expensive. In
addition, such arguments are tenuous and therefore fragile. Further-
more, when avoiding antitrust liability depends on such convoluted
theorizing, the judicial process becomes an exercise in deception. The
best chance for accepting most of the arguments a city could make
would be sympathy on the part of the district judge which was gen-
erated by a feeling that Boulder was wrongly decided.9"
Yet, when the defendant is a city, it should be valid for a court
to consider the legitimate governmental goals of the city to assess the
city's liability. The city's liability should not depend on the ability of
its attorney to torture an argument borrowed from private sector an-
88. Id. at 692.
89. Id.
90. SAN JOSE, CAL., MUNI. CODE § 17.23.020 (1979).
91. See supra notes 87.89 and accompanying text.
92. See generally supra pt. III. See supra notes 19-42 and accompanying text (state
action immunity); notes 43-66 and accompanying text (Noerr-Pennington immunity); notes
67-76 accompanying text (no duality).
93. See, e.g., Pennyroyal Cablevision, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 543. See also supra note 39
and accompanying text.
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titrust litigation into a shape acceptable to the district judge. There
should be overt recognition that an antitrust suit against a city is
different from an antitrust suit against a private corporation. A city
is supposed to pursue social/welfare goals, whereas a private corpo-
ration is supposed to pursue economic goals and leave the protection
of social/welfare interests to the government.94
This situation-an antitrust suit against the city for enacting
and enforcing a rent control ordinance-provides ample basis for
creating a new standard.
B. Basis for a New Standard of Liability
In Boulder, the Court concluded its opinion by observing that
"'[it] may be that certain activities which might appear anticompeti-
tive when engaged in by private parties, take on a different complex-
ion when adopted by a local government.' "" This statement signi-
fies the Court's recognition that an antitrust suit against a city differs
from a suit against a private defendant. The difference is that a city
has a legitimate concern with social/welfare objectives, whereas a
private defendant does not." The Court in Boulder did not, then,
intend to preclude the possibility of using a special standard of liabil-
ity when a city is the defendant.
Indeed, such a standard is foreshadowed by the Court's citation
in the same passage: "Compare, e.g., National Society of Profes-
94. Hoskins, supra note 2, at 684-85: The "competitive yardstick" test is applicable to
analyze competitive conduct of private corporations, but it is inapplicable to analyze the social
welfare conduct of municipalities. See also National Soc'y of Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 692. The
reason for the competitve yardstick test is that neither private industry nor the courts are
equipped to make social policy decisions because that is a matter that should be left to the
discretion of the legislative branch of government. In Fashion Originators Guild of Am., Inc. v.
FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941), the Court said: "[Tlhe combination is in reality an extra-govern-
mental agency, which prescribes rules for the regulation and restraint of interstate commerce,
and provides extra-judicial tribunals for determination and punishment of violations, and thus
'trenches upon the power of the national legislature and violates the statute.' " Id. at 465-66
(quoting Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899)).
Equal protection cases challenging city ordinances show that it is the function of the city
legislature to provide for the public welfare. In such an attack against the city of New Orle-
ans, the Court recited its familiar formula that "the judiciary may not sit as a superlegislature
to judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy determinations in areas that neither
affect fundamental rights nor proceed along suspect lines." City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427
U.S. 297, 303 (1976). This passage demonstrates the Court's assumption that the deferential
standard of review applied to state and federal statutes is extended to city ordinances. This is
true because the federal, state, and city legislatures, not the courts, are the bodies charged with
formulating social policy.
95. Boulder, 455 U.S. at 56-57, n.20, (quoting City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 417 n.48).
96. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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sional Engineers v. United States [citation omitted] . . . (consider-
ing the validity of anticompetitive restraint imposed by private agree-
ment), with Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland [citation
omitted] . . . (holding that anticompetitive effect is an insufficient
basis for invalidating a state law)."'97 This citation indicates that the
Court believes it appropriate to recognize the right and obligation of
local governments to pursue social/welfare goals-objectives that are
not appropriate to weigh when the rule of reason test is applied in a
case involving a private defendant."
A special standard of liability for a defendant city is predicated
on the notion, recognized by the Court in Boulder,99 that a city has
legitimate governmental objectives that may justify the possible an-
ticompetitive effects of its ordinances. National Society of Profes-
sional Engineers,00 often considered to be the biggest threat to a
city because of its purely competitive approach,' 0 ' actually supports
consideration of social goals where the defendant is a city.
In National Society of Professional Engineers, the Court re-
fused to look at anything other than "the competitive significance of
the restraint" because it was not the function of a private industry or
of the courts to decide whether a policy is or is not in the public
interest.'02 In that case, the defendants argued that the Society's
rules, which restrained trade by not allowing engineers to compete
on the basis of price, were justified because they served the public
interest.' 03 The Court responded that it is the function of the legisla-
tive branch and not that of the judiciary or of the Society to decide to
displace competition with regulation in the interest of the public
welfare.'
In considering the potential liability of a city for enacting a rent
control ordinance,0 5 the courts are concerned with the functions of
the legislative branch of local government. It therefore follows from
the rationale of National Society of Professional Engineers that a
97. Boulder, 455 U.S. at 56-57, n.20.
98. See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text. See also Vanderstar, supra note 2, at
400-01.
99. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
100. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
101. See supra notes 85-91 and accompanying text. See Hoskins, supra note 2, at 685;
Vanderstar, supra note 2, at 390.
102. National Soc'y of Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 692.
103. Id. at 695-96.
104. Id.
105. If a city is justified in enacting an ordinance in its legislative capacity, it can hardly
be held liable for enforcing the same ordinance in its administrative capacity. Therefore, if it is
not liable for enacting an ordinance, it will not be liable for enforcing it.
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city's legitimate governmental goals are important to an analysis of
the city's potential liability.
C. The New Standard
Under this standard, the court would assess the city's liability
under a two step analysis. The court must first determine the nature
of the goal pursued by the city.'" If the city's goal is economic, the
existing standard of liability should apply. The federal government
has evinced its view that the public's economic interest will be best
served by protecting competition through its enacting and maintain-
ing antitrust laws.107 The decision of the federal government is, of
course, binding on a city.108
However, if the city's goal includes general health, safety or
welfare factors, the court's inquiry would proceed to step two: an
examination of whether the restraint on competition ancillary to the
legitimate goal is rationally related to the accomplishment of that
goal.109 If there is a rational relationship, it should be sufficient to
justify the restraint. Any attempt to employ a balancing test would
involve weighing the worthiness of the city's goal against the harm of
the ancillary anticompetitive restraint; the court would then be judg-
ing the wisdom of the city's legislative choice.110 This is exactly the
practice the Court has condemned, under whatever guise it has been
presented by hopeful plaintiffs,"1 since the close of the Lochner
era. 
11 2
In National Society of Professional Engineers, the Supreme
Court specifically rejected the notion that the judiciary is equipped to
decide when the public health, safety, and welfare justify a displace-
ment of competition with regulation. 8 Because it is the proper
function of the city government, and not of the courts, to determine
whether benefits to the public welfare outweigh the harms to compe-
106. It may be wise for cities to make legislative findings and to declare the city's pur-
pose in the ordinance in order to escape liability. See How to Lower Your Antitrust Risk, 9
CURRENT MUN. PROB. 270, 271 (1982).
107. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911).
108. U.S. CONST. art. VI (supremacy clause).
109. This inquiry would resemble the equal protection/rational basis test as applied in
Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (the state's chosen scheme
must be reasonably designed to further the purpose identified by the state).
110. See Boulder, 455 U.S. at 67-68 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
111. See supra note 4 and preceding text.
112. This event took place when Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, was decided in
1934.
113. See supra notes 98-104 and accompanying text.
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tition caused by a particular ordinance, the city should not be liable
for enacting the ordinance as long as the competitive restraint is ra-
tionally related to accomplishment of the legitimate goal.""
The court must have some test for differentiating between an
economic goal and a public welfare goal,115 otherwise it would al-
ways be possible to disguise an economic goal as a health/safety/
welfare goal. The court must first distinguish the city's goal from the
means it chooses to implement that goal. The goal may be the public
welfare even though the means are economic.
A city with an economic goal intends to promulgate an eco-
nomic policy because it believes that a particular economic policy is
desirable in itself. A city using economic means to reach a public
policy objective believes that the goal can be best accomplished
through an economic scheme.
When the goal is economic, the city must contend with the full
blast of the antitrust laws because Congress has already decided that
competition is the desirable economic policy.11 6 However, when only
the means are economic, the city should be entitled to the protection
of the proposed new standard. 1 7 The common theme linking modern
constitutional law cases is that, when a legislative body enacts a rule
designed to further a legitimate goal, and the means chosen are rea-
sonably designed to effectuate that goal, a court cannot question the
legislative choice.1 8 This theme persists when the court is adjudicat-
ing an antitrust dispute.1 1'
The standard of liability that is applied to find an economic
goal is different from the standard that is applied if the goal is one of
the public welfare and is implemented by economic means. Simi-
larly, under the equal protection component of the Constitution,'20 a
finding that a legislature acted with a discriminatory purpose will
result in the application of the "strict scrutiny" test.' 1 If, however,
114. The rational relationship standard would also reduce the heavy costs of antitrust
litigation, see supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text, because the number of elements nec-
essary to prove would be reduced.
115. "Public welfare goal" and "social goal" are used interchangeably with "health/
safety/welfare goal."
116. See supra notes 106-108 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 106-110 and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 4. See also Minnesota v. Cloverleaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456,
470 (1981) ("[I]t is not the function of the courts to substitute their evaluation of legislative
facts for that of the legislature.").
119. See supra notes 113-114 and accompanying text.
120. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
121. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). In this case, black police candidates
who had failed the police examination sued the District of Columbia, claiming that use of the
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the legislature was pursuing a legitimate goal, the discriminatory ef-
feet of a law only merits minimal scrutiny.12 2 The discriminatory
impact of the law is evidence of discriminatory purpose, but if it can
be shown that the legislature intended to serve legitimate ends, the
law will not be invalidated."2
An analogous test can be developed to distinguish between a
purposeful economic restraint or economic goal and an economic re-
straint ancillary to a legitimate goal. If an ordinance appears to be
an economic regulation and has only economic effects, it can be char-
acterized as an economic ordinance. In that case the city's liability
will be judged by the existing antitrust standard.1 24
Conversely, if some valid health, safety or welfare objective ap-
pears in the legislative history, declaration of legislative purpose, or
effects of the regulation, the regulation should be classified as a
health/safety/welfare ordinance. The new standard is designed for
this situation.' 2
5
D. Application of the New Standard
The city's goal in enacting a rent control ordinance is usually a
public welfare goal. If a city imposed rent control simply because the
city officials thought that regulating rents was a better economic sys-
tem than allowing rents to be set by competition, the city would be
asserting an economic goal. However, it is more probable that a city
would impose rent controls in order to enable its citizens to obtain
affordable housing. Therefore, the city would be using an economic
means to reach a public health, safety and welfare goal.
examination unfairly discriminated against black candidates. The plaintiffs produced evidence
showing that a disproportionate number of black candidates failed the test. The Supreme
Court stated that the purpose of the equal protecton component of the Constitution was to
ensure that legislators do not act with a discriminatory purpose. The Court held that discrimi-
natory effects of a law are not enough to invalidate the law, and that the plaintiff must show
discriminatory purpose.
122. Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980); Personnel Adm'r. of Mass. v. Feeney, 442
U.S. 256 (1979). In Bolden, the black citizens of Mobile brought a class action against the
city, alleging that the practice of electing the city commissioners at large unfairly diluted the
black vote. In Feeney, the plaintiff was a woman who had failed to obtain a civil service
position because preference was given to a male veteran pursuant to a Massachusetts law
favoring veterans. In both cases, the plaintiffs lost because their complaints involved discrimi-
natory effects and failed to show discriminatory purpose.
123. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241-42 (1976).
124. See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
126. CAL. ASSEMBLY COMM. ON HOUS. AND COMMUNITY DEV. RENT CONTROL: AN
INTERiM REPORT, CAL. ASSEMBLY OF 1975, at 36 (1975).
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Shelter is one of the fundamental necessities of human exis-
tence. " ' In the last decade and a half there has been an increased
concern regarding the ability of city dwellers to obtain adequate
housing.' 28 It is this concern that has led cities to promulgate rent
control ordinances.' 29 When a city decides it is necessary to provide
for the public shelter, a reasonable means of accomplishing that goal
is to impose rent controls.' 30
A necessary concomitant circumstance to rent control is that it
creates a competitive restraint because it does not allow the market
mechanism to set the rental price. However, this restraint is reasona-
ble if rent control is a rational method of accomplishing the city's
legitimate goal of providing shelter for its citizens. Therefore, the
city has not violated the antitrust laws under the new standard of
liability. This result is consonant with existing antitrust case law, 8'
and comports with the courts' goal of judicial restraint."'
E. The New Standard is Congruent with Underlying Antitrust
Policy
The new standard is consistent with the policy underlying the
antitrust laws. The antitrust laws were created to deal with eco-
nomic problems in the private sector."' Courts recognize that the
antitrust laws are "aimed primarily at combinations having commer-
cial objectives and should be applied sparingly to organizations that
• . . have some other objectives ... 184 Thus, the proposed ra-
tional relationship test would not impinge on the purpose of the anti-
trust laws, because it would only protect legitimate governmental
bodies in carrying out their legitimate governmental objectives.
127. A. H. MASLOW, MOTIVATION AND PERSONALITY 39-43 (2d ed. 1970). Shelter is
comprehended in Maslow's "safety need" as one of the lowest level basic needs.
128. Mitchell, When Housing's Tight, Are Rent Controls Necessary?, 9 CALIF. J. 53
(1978), reprinted in J. DUKEMINIER & J. KRIER, PROPERTY 200-02 (1981).
129. SAN JOSE, CAL., MUN. CODE § 17.23.020 (1979). See supra note 8 and accompa-
nying text.
130. See J. DUKEMINIER & J. KRIER, supra note 128, at 202: "[Clontrols are a subject
about which reasonable people might differ, and in such circumstances courts are inclined to
defer to legislative judgments."
131. See supra notes 95-104 and accompanying text.
132. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 78-86 and accompanying text.
134. M & H Tire Co., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 560 F. Supp. 591, 606 (D.
Mass. 1983). See also Feldman v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 562 F. Supp. 941 (N.D. Ill.
1982), in which the court stated: "[Tihe antitrust laws are not intended to protect profit mar-




Because the Supreme Court decisively found in Boulder that a
municipality could be liable for violating the antitrust laws, cities
have been vulnerble to antitrust attack. One possible basis for attack
is a city's enactment and enforcement of a rent control ordinance.
It would be difficult for a city to avoid liability if it had to fight
an antitrust suit with arguments extrapolated from case law involv-
ing a private corporation, because these arguments become elaborate
and tenuous when applied to cities. Furthermore, the corporation
analysis would not allow a city to justify the anticompetitive effect of
the ordinance by emphasizing the ordinance's beneficial public wel-
fare goal.'3 5 Because a city should prevail when it is acting to further
the public health, safety or welfare, a new standard of antitrust lia-
bility is needed in cases when the defendant is a city.
A "rational relationship" test would protect the city from liabil-
ity when it is acting in the interests of its citizens and would comport
with the purpose and history of the antitrust laws. Under this test, a
court would first distinguish the objective of the city policy under
attack. If the goal was economic, the existing standard of liability
would apply. If the goal was to further the public health, safety, or
welfare, the court's inquiry would be confined to examining whether
the competitive restraint ancillary to the legitimate goal is rationally
related to accomplishing that goal.
A city which enacts a rent control ordinance is ordinarily at-
tempting to advance the legitimate goal of providing shelter for its
citizens. Rent control ordinances are reasonable measures to adopt
for this purpose, and the restraint on the landlords' ability to recover
competitively set profits is a necessary corollary to a rent control or-
dinance. Therefore, a city should not be subject to antitrust liability
for enacting a rent control ordinance." 6
Vanessa Wells
135. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
136. After this comment was completed, the California Supreme Court decided a case in
which it enunciated a test for municipal liability similar to that proposed in this comment.
Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 37 Cal. 3d 644, 693 P.2d 261, 209 Cal. Rptr. (1984).
In Fisher, Berkeley landlords challenged Berkeley's rent control ordinance on several
grounds. No antitrust issue was raised at the trial or at the lower appellate level. 37 Cal. 3d at
710 (Bird, C.J., concurring). Also, the issue was not raised by a party, but by amicus curiae.
Nevertheless, the California Supreme Court held that it was not precluded from addressing the
issue. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 654.
The California Supreme Court's ruling of course, is not decisive of this issue of federal
law because the California Court cannot bind a federal court on a federal question. The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court opinion, however, may have some persuasive value.
Fisher was subsequently granted certiorari by the United States Supreme Court. 105 S.
Ct. 2356 (1985).
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